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PSB-2-40
April 16, 1953

Page 3, para. 4.(1) - Delete last sentence:

"This development and the announced changes in governmental structure, indicate careful preparation and premeditation."

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Page 4. - Delete para. (2) and substitute:

(2) The reorganization of the party and governmental apparatus has some similarities to the organization employed during World War II, which points to an effort to concentrate power in a manageably small number of hands and to present, both internally and externally, an impression of hardness and unity and continuity at the top.

Page 4. para (4) - Delete last sentence:

"However, the peoples of the Soviet Union are definitely not playing a major role in the situation."

Page 4. - Delete para. (5) and substitute:

(5) Although current "peace" moves suggest that the Kremlin is altering its conduct of foreign and domestic policies, there is nothing at the present time which indicates a fundamental change in the long-range objectives of the Soviet government.

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Page 5. - Delete para. c. and substitute:

c. On the other hand, the very rapidity with which the transfer of power has been effected, the nature of this change, and measures taken by the Kremlin to obtain the good will of the people, together with the unimpressive funeral ceremonies and the brevity of the mourning period for Stalin, and the warnings against "disorder and panic," suggest that nervousness and concern over the stability of the new regime are prevalent at the highest levels.

Page 5. para. d. - Substitute the following for second sentence through sub-paragraphs (1) and (2):

However, it is also in the nature of such a new regime that it must try to achieve the appearance of strength and permanence. On balance, therefore, it is concluded that:

(1) The new regime is unlikely to undertake any actions that would lead to general war.

(2) While altering certain lines in the conduct of foreign and domestic policies the new rulers will probably adhere for the time being to the doctrines of Soviet communism.

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Para. 6. - Delete para. f. and substitute:

Regardless of its overt attitudes toward the outside world, the new regime is bound to be concerned with the consolidation of its internal position. Serious friction within the regime may nevertheless arise over external issues, and is especially likely to occur in dealing with novel or difficult decisions.

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Page 7, para. b. - After (1) insert:

(2) To exploit the basis of schism between the leaders of the Kremlin and major power elements of the Soviet bloc, including the military establishment.

and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly; then add:

(10) To expose vigorously the motives and pitfalls of any false "peace" campaigns.

(11) Without contributing to the prestige of the Soviet regime, to combat any wishful thinking in the free world as to the current weakness of world communism.

(12) To react resolutely to any new aggression.

Page 7, para. (3) - Delete "Malenkov" and substitute "the regime."

Page 8, para. (4) - Delete "Malenkov" and substitute "the Soviet regime."

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~~Para. 1.~~ - Delete paragraphs c. and d.

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Para 9. - Delete last para. (b) and substitute:

(b) We should exploit the possible weakening of ties between the Kremlin and Communist parties throughout the world due to the absence of any outstanding figure of stature, experience and ideological prowess as the new leader of world communism.

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~~Para 10.~~ - Delete para. f. and substitute:

f. ~~Phase.~~

(1) Initial Period. During the next few weeks a serious effort is justified in order to prolong and exploit the condition of nervousness following the sudden transfer of power. A major part of this effort should be to set forth the issues which prevent free world countries and the USSR from achieving a genuine world peace and to place the onus squarely upon the Soviet government for failure to accept U. S. offers to resolve these issues. The Presidential speech is assumed above especially for this reason.

(2) Subsequent Phase. It is most important that initial action be followed by a series of integrated steps. Above all, operations should be prepared to make the Kremlin assume maximum liability if it does not accept the proposals in the Presidential speech. Measures should be taken to germinate the seeds of disunity and to probe for vulnerabilities in the Soviet system. If events develop very favorably, these steps could culminate in a

(3) Glitter in which the communist system would break into open internal conflict. This culminating phase in our strategy should begin if and when such conflict seems near. It is never too soon, the strategy should still have contributed usefully to our basic purpose.

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~~Pages 14 through 22a~~ - Delete all of para. 3.B. in PART II, beginning
on page 14.

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